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INTRODUCTION
Our first impression of other people is
greatly affected by our previous experi-
ences. Schematic processing, proposed in
social psychology, explains our behavior in
interacting with other people. It suggests
existence of different schemas in our brain
for different groups of people, e.g., extro-
verts, introverts, shy, women, men, etc.
and also schemas related to special people
like our parents, close friends, supervi-
sor, and even ourselves. Each schema is
recalled when we meet the corresponding
person/personality (Atkinson, 1996).
On the other hand there is a rela-
tively well accepted theory–model based
theory- in motor control and learning
studies (Daw and Dayan, 2014; Dayan
and Berridge, 2014). It suggests exis-
tence of some internal models (forward
and/or inverse) in the brain which help
us for planning and execution of the
actions.
Although these two viewpoints may
seem very distinct, there are some inter-
esting similarities between them, which
are explained in the following section.
I hypothesize that these correspondences
may suggest that the brain employs
same algorithms in dealing with both
situations.
Understanding the brain function is a
great challenge formany scientists. Further
evaluation of the proposed hypothesis may
be helpful to achieve better understand-
ing of the brain function, as advances in
each field may encourage new ideas in the
other one.
In the following sections each of the two
viewpoints and then their similarities are
explained.
STEREOTYPES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Stereotype is defined as “a fixed, often
simplistic generalization about a particular
group or class of people (Cardwell, 2014)”.
Stereotypes, schemas, and schematic pro-
cessing enable us to efficiently organize
and process the huge volume of input
information to our brain. Instead of pro-
cessing every little detail about a new per-
son, we can just recall the most similar
schemas and generally categorize the per-
son e.g., based on his most obvious phys-
ical features (Atkinson, 1996). Stereotypes
enable us to respond rapidly in situations
which we have had similar experience.
Despite all the benefits, stereotypes may
also result in prejudice. Since they bias
our impressions, they can have very nega-
tive and even mortal (e.g., Amadou Diallo
case) consequences (Atkinson, 1996).
INTERNAL MODELS IN MOTOR
CONTROL AND LEARNING STUDIES
Internal models are defined as repre-
sentations of external objects and/or
our body organs in the brain (Kawato,
1999) (see Yavari et al., 2013 for a
review). They are categorized into “for-
ward” and “inverse” which mimic the
“input-output” and “output-input” rela-
tionship of the related object/organ,
respectively. Model-based theory suggests
that motor learning/adaptation leads to
formation/modification of internal mod-
els (Hunter et al., 2009). Kawato et al. have
proposed co-existence of multiple pairs
of internal forward-inverse models in the
brain and therefore, a modular structure
for motor control and learning (Wolpert
and Kawato, 1998; Haruno et al., 2001,
2003; Doya et al., 2002; Imamizu et al.,
2003; Wada et al., 2003). Based on this
idea, which has been supported by dif-
ferent behavioral and imaging evidence
(Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Imamizu
et al., 2003), there are an inverse (con-
troller) and a forward (predictor) internal
model within each pair. Contribution of
each controller to the final motor com-
mand is determined based on accuracy
of the linked forward model. This modu-
lar structure can explain our remarkable
ability in motor learning, adaptation, and
behavioral switching (Haruno et al., 2003).
SIMILARITIES OF THE TWO
MENTIONED VIEWPOINTS
Some similarities between the two men-
tioned viewpoints are described here:
- Both processes are implicit and uncon-
scious. Associations which are acti-
vated through stereotypes can be deeply
learned and become automatic (as
shown by priming-based experiments)
(Rudman and Borgida, 1995; Atkinson,
1996; Bargh et al., 1996). Similarly, after
enough practice, a motor skill (such
as driving) can be performed uncon-
sciously and without need to attention
(Schmahmann, 1997).
- Based on primary effect, the ini-
tial information which we receive
(e.g., hear) about a person signifi-
cantly bias our impression of him/her.
This effect has been explained using
schematic processing as follows: we try
to achieve a general impression about
the person by searching for the most
consistent schema or stereotype with
the input information. This schema
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determines our judgment about his/her
personality.
There is a same process about internal
models in motor control: when manip-
ulating a new tool the most suitable
FM/IM pair is activated based on con-
text, e.g., by looking at the object’s
appearance, and the corresponding IM
is used as controller. In the next trial,
the pair which produced the least min-
imum prediction error will be activated
and used (Wolpert et al., 2003).
- Stereotypes help us in inference, i.e.,
making judgment beyond the given
information. For instance when we hear
that someone is affectionate, we will
probably consider him/her also a gen-
erous person (Atkinson, 1996). There
is conceptually similar to generaliza-
tion in motor learning which has been
proposed to be resulted from inter-
nal models. An internal model formed
by practicing a motor action under a
special condition can partly be gen-
eralized to other circumstances. For
example, practicing a movement with
the right hand generates a learning
which partly generalizes to the left hand
(Sainburg and Wang, 2002; Wang and
Sainburg, 2006; Balitsky Thompson and
Henriques, 2010).
- One of the famous models in impres-
sion formation is the continuum model
(Fiske et al., 1999) which describes
the whole range of processes from
stereotypes to individuation. Based on
this model, automatic stereotypes are
the first psychological process activated
when we meet someone for the first
time. We categorize this person uncon-
sciously and automatically in terms of
age, sex, and ethnicity. This is called
initial categorization. If the person is
important for us, we obtain more infor-
mation about him (piecemeal integra-
tion) and finally judge him based on
his individual characteristics (individ-
uation). Proceeding from stereotypes
toward individuation happens slowly
(Atkinson, 1996).
Based on internal model theory learn-
ing a new motor skill goes through
an almost similar process: When we
try to manipulate a new object, in the
early stage, CNS combines output sig-
nals from internal models of most sim-
ilar (and familiar) objects. After some
practice we learn to manipulate the new
object skillfully and the reason is the
special internal model which has been
formed for it (Imamizu and Kawato,
2012). Depending on the complexity of
the new motor task, its learning would
need different time. It could take even
years (e.g., for professional athletes).
As it can be seen in both situations,
in a new condition reliance is more on
previous experience, while gathering more
information over time leads to formation
of special new internal model/stereotype.
CONCLUSION
Human brain is probably the most fasci-
nating creation in the world. Many sci-
entists in different fields are trying to
understand its function. Here I hypoth-
esized that maybe our brain applies the
same policy for some distinct applications,
e.g., social interaction and manipulating
different objects.
It worth mentioning that internal mod-
els have been proposed not only in motor
control and learning, but also in some
other fields such as control of mental
activities (Ito, 2008), cognitive planning
(Dayan and Yu, 2006), and decision mak-
ing (Daw et al., 2011). These processes
may even have more in common with
stereotypes.
It would be interesting to also com-
pare the corresponding neural substrates
for stereotypes and internal models. Cell
recording in some animal studies (Liu
et al., 2003; Cerminara et al., 2009; Laurens
et al., 2013) and also imaging studies
(Imamizu et al., 2000, 2003; Blakemore
et al., 2001; Kawato et al., 2003; Higuchi
et al., 2007; Milner et al., 2007) sug-
gest lateral and anterior cerebellum as
the probable site of formation or stor-
age of internal models. Some studies have
suggested that motor cortex and other
frontal motor areas have important roles
in computation of internal models (Li
et al., 2001; Shadmehr, 2004; Richardson
et al., 2006; Shadmehr and Krakauer,
2008). Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
has been proposed as a candidate region in
model-based evaluation (Hampton et al.,
2006, 2008; Valentin et al., 2007; Daw
et al., 2011). On the other hand, some
neuroimaging studies have shown mPFC
as a crucial region in social inferences,
(Mitchell et al., 2005a,b, 2006), and judg-
ments of warmth and competence (Harris
and Fiske, 2006). Activity in middle mPFC
is shown to be associated with thinking
about either the self or a similar other
(Ida Gobbini et al., 2004; Mitchell et al.,
2006); while activity in dorsal mPFC is
associated with thinking about a dissim-
ilar other. Therefore, mPFC seems to be
important for ingroup and outgroup per-
ception (Amodio and Lieberman, 2009).
Perceiving a person as a social being, which
has been proposed to form the basis of
prejudice (Qiu, 2006), has been suggested
to be dependent on dorsal mPFC (Amodio
and Lieberman, 2009). Therefore, PFC
seems to be a crucial brain region for both
internal models and stereotypes.
Further evaluation of the proposed
hypothesis may be helpful to achieve better
understanding of the brain function. For
example as it was mentioned, stereotypes
have significant effect on our social life and
undeniable effect on impression forma-
tion. They sometimes have negative (even
mortal) impact on our judgments, because
they bias our impressions. The more we
increase our knowledge about this con-
cept, themore we canmodify our thoughts
in a good manner.
Discoveries in each field may lead to
new findings in the other. For instance
it has been shown that stereotypes may
be activated through unconscious prim-
ing; e.g., in an experiment by Bargh et al.
(1996) seeing images of young African
American men triggered more aggressive
behavior compared to images of young
Caucasian men, even though the images
were displayed for less than thirty thou-
sandths seconds (subliminally) (Atkinson,
1996). This observation can be verified
about motor actions as well. For exam-
ple to investigate if seeing a special tool,
such as a piano, can prime the piano play-
ing skill. This can be both useful for better
understanding the motor related mecha-
nisms in the brain and also in practical
applications such as preparing the athletes
before their match to achieve better results.
The proposed hypothesis needs to be
verified by some specially-designed exper-
iments.
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